Intel Corporation is a Crime Ring, a Deliberate Fraud on Consumers, Wiping OUT all Competition with Brute Force and Bribes.

"FTC Docket 9288, May 1998.. So How Long has the FTC, SEC, DOJ Protected Intel Corp.?"

Beginning Docket 9288, May 1998..
So How Long has the FTC, SEC, DOJ Protected Intel Corp.?

Over a Decade. And Consumers are Still Paying the Price, Shareholders are Paying for Intel's Crimes and Will SOON pay Billions More.. Tax Payers pay for the Over Looking by Your Governement Agent's of Intel's Crimes..

Prior Reports IGNORED by those Paid to Protect YOU???
when is ENOUGH - Enough with Intel...??

"" Beginning Docket 9288, May 1998, various reports and analysis are submitted by this analyst to FTC now operating in voluntary civic service capacity under Department of Labor Code 3363.5.

Today a decade of analysis delivers tens of
Docket 9341
discovery proofs or pointers to proofs.

Many of which this audience are familiar from prior reports by this analyst submitted to U.S. Senate, Congress, State AGs and U.S. Attorneys.

Under Docket 9341 discovery rules, work from this analyst is passed by FTC Bureau of Competition to Intel for legal rebuttal.

Three Components of Monopoly Recovery

Monopoly recovery is a worldwide financial value having three main components:

1) Consumer recovery is based on the system costs of Intel Inside tied charge back for routing Intel microprocessors across state lines and inter nation boundaries inside a computer chassis.

See prior analyst submissions for specific details covering the illegal aspects of this market rigging rebate fee scheme.

2) Consumer recovery from monopoly price premium associated with some Intel microprocessor and PC product introductions.

3) Industrial harms which include predatory product dumping, Intel selling at a price less then average total cost, measures of variable down to average fixed cost.

Finally, estimation of the marginal cost for Intel to produce a single x86 microprocessor in relation to price sought with variable cost cross check.

Where price is within or lower then average fixed cost, variable or marginal cost, revenues from those quantities are recorded as an industrial monopolization recovery value for FTC discovery.

Consumer Recovery Subset 1; kick back, in violation of Sherman Act Section 1, Section 2, Clayton Act Section 2, 3, 4, 5, 13e, 13c, 13d, Title 48, 1986 anti kickback act

Of the $26.442 billion subset of consumer recovery documented from Intel production estimates (where $42 billion total set is documented by contract), $22.657 billion or 85% is associated with Intel Inside tied charge back sum misrepresented in Intel and PC Dealer financials.

That sum is split between Intel and PC Companies 50:50 for the purpose of this analysis based on the Intel Inside monopoly system metric.

Yet Intel’s portion is known to increase, and PC Companies decrease, over the 15 year duration of this Intel Insider operation.

Intel financials associate Intel Inside as a marketing cost credited to PC Company micro- processor sales. When this commissionable sales value is actually an accrued Dealer rebate passed through Intel as a sales reward for Media Sales Agents taken as their fee, to sustain the supply chain’s product distribution ties between Intel, PC Dealers and Media Agent’s sales channels.

Sales Channels include PC Week, PC Magazine, Computer Shopper, Family Computing, PC World, Windows Magazine, other PC and some general media.

Rebate Values are Sustained from back in time with
forward time purchase agreements.

Production short run to short run, Dealer’s microprocessor purchases are unnaturally weighted to benefit them guiding Media Agents sales preferences.

Intel 1st tier Dealers purchase microprocessors in excess of end demand solely to strip margin values, including consumer transport charge, prior to reselling overage into secondary broker channels.

PC Dealers who are Intel’s 1st tier brokers monopolize majority of Intel margin values, including tied charge back, sustaining their Media Sales Agent artificial attractor and the cross industry distribution tie in total.

This relationship is a financially driven one, planned and implemented for Media Sales Agents to register, meter, report level’s of Intel microprocessor flows through PC dealer channels back to Intel.

That is the nature of the charge back;
for media registering and reporting back channel sales flows
through PC Companies to Intel.

Over time the system evolved into one which accelerated Dealer Product Flows artificially from one Intel product generation to the next, on the weight of Intel kickback placements meant to discharge certain Dealer inventory, to end market buyers, on an Intel time schedule. ""
Source of Post
Document the FTC, DOJ, SEC, State Attorney Generals, FBI and more know of and seem to be ignoring.. Go to www.CEOpaulOtellini.com document at top of blog...

Above Report by Mike Bruzzone
Camp Marketing Consultancy


Crystal L. Cox
Investigative Blogger
Crystal@CrystalCox.com

Do You Have an Intel Corruption Tip?
Email Me...
Time to Tell the Truth about Intel Corp.
and ALL their "Corrupt Fraternity"..

This is Not Intel Nation
this is "We the People" and Intel Corp.
is Robbing Consumers, Governments and
paying Off everyone who gets in their way...
or Worse... and this is in Many Countries..

www.InvestigativeBlogger.com

FTC in Intel Settlement Talks; before July 22? Intel Closed Door Settlements with the FTC? Intel Executive Amnesty???

"FTC in Intel Settlement Talks; before July 22?

Please be advised this analyst is opposed to Intel closed door settlement with FTC on or before July 22; transparency being at issue.

Commissioners and discovery team know RICO, Sherman Act Section 1 and Section 2 per se violations are documented.

This analyst encourages the September hearing proceed accordingly for full disclosure, full remedies, consumer recovery which is a core value of the FTC’s charter.

Advantageously and for hearing efficiency, all Section 2 Rule of Reason claims lacking specific per se condemnation precedent, can be reviewed between the Section 1 and RICO Proofs, without fear of FTC 9341 overall case loss.

Including waste of Federal financial and manpower resource, further, that FCA has already been won on weight of evidence and is itself capable of recovering a portion, if not all, FTC 9341 litigation costs.

This analyst believes it important that every American know how to spot competition espionage occurring in the work place in real time, how to report in real time, how to resolve in real time and not over 18 year’s time as in my case.

In this continuing case of Intel Monopoly analysis, meant for FTC and DOJ discovery, leadership, error correction, law augments, inter Nation competition policy evolution, Intel Network, system and structural improvement, RICO and competition remedies and consumer recoveries.

In addition financial recovery of the economic damages for all targets harmed and pushed under by Intel Network, including in the Docket 9288 case obstruction are required under Intel’s DOJ antitrust compliance obligations.

That is for Intel and Network Executive Amnesty and or immunity from maximum antitrust and RICO damages. This would seem to include those associated with FTC Docket 9341.

I’d presume Intel is Participating in reversing the frame and fraud associated with Docket 9288 obstruction.

Alternatively in the face of a known obstruction in the administration of justice which includes witness tampering, fraudulent construction and white wash, the Docket 9341 clock could be reset to June 11, 1991.

June 11, 1991 is the inception of the Intel Insider Scheme enabling a complete Intel monopoly consumer recovery.

Pursuant to Docket 9341, I am concerned that $72 billion dollars in monopolization have been calculated.

And that the worldwide consumer recoverable from Intel tied charge back, and monopoly price of up to $42 billion, will be left un-recovered or left on the negotiating table in any FTC closed door Docket 9341 settlement.

Our knowing this fact of the consumer recoverable, legitimately, consumers are due their return from Intel and Network members.

The history of Intel class actions suggests any privately litigated consumer class action will be blown or settled on disproportionate values too harms.

This attorney opinion is supported by historical evaluation, including attorneys who would take the FCA, if not for their knowledge of the history of Intel market rigging, the various corporate political, time trap and litigation hurdles.

Intel Network adverse litigation for year’s has been sand bagged, blown, thrown and settled on minor causes with slim remedies and minor financial recovery in relation to harms. Here our countries history of private antitrust litigation ends until attorneys who would risk toughest corporate, political, legal and judicial hurdles resolves itself.

FTC and DOJ can restart that tradition of private antitrust litigation with full Intel Network disclosures, monopoly encompassing remedies and recoveries, where world wide consumer recoveries are due consumers including the Federal government.

Bursting boilers and the Federal Power, Garrison Dam Disaster and the Federal Power, Bar Pilots and the Federal Power, Finance & Securities Disaster and Federal Power, broken oil well valves and the Federal Power, broken regulatory & the Federal Power; fixing broken Intel and the Federal Power, transparently, offers the potential for one of Intel’s greatest legacies.

A cornerstone on which willing members of Bar and Bench, and corporate entities, will see and take action regulation seriously. Lacking Bar and Bench free from corporate political network control, I fear broken regulatory will remain.

A functional regulatory, Bar & Bench, are required first lines of monopoly and rackets error detection and correction.

Pursuant to FCA, I will be requesting Congress and/or President Obama please assign a Federal attorney for qui tam representation.

A case to whom I am recognized Relator and hold the U.S. Attorney recovery reward letter, having been steward for many years before and following my official Relator status.

No legitimate private attorney will take the case in the face of the market rig.

Fifth, finance and investment bankers use Quanda model, with price projection tools, to model Intel revenue and margins; like media retrospectively, to play the stock up to two years in advance.

Sixth, Intel inside individual stock traders can do the same thing as I’ve demonstrated to FTC and U.S. DOJ.

Seventh, the Intel Quanda on mass weight of use, retrospectively, extended Intel’s x86 and PC market rigs to the NASDAQ; including in relation to other exchanges.

Think about it, Intel Insider ability to play the stock of Intel and PC Dealers up to two years in advance is an extreme catalyst to rig not only individual stock prices, but the NASDAQ index itself.

The Quanda was used to rig markets;
Intel had DOJ 1st report responsibility.

Eight, combination and cartel proofs exist throughout Intel economic and system structural proofs. Structural proofs are easily deciphered from their component patterns and prove intent to monopolize per se. No other conduct proofs are required.

Nine, U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission are well aware of the Section 1 per se condemnations, Section 2 per se intent, RICO, Quanda and its reliance by Intel Network as one of their many market rigging tools.

Ten, for FTC there is no risk of Docket 9341 case loss where all Section 2 Rule of Reason claims concerning access to Intel component taper, Intel benchmark rigging, false statements to Federal procurement by Intel, Dealers and Agents concealing fraudulent and monopoly costs assessed on the Federal Government computer payment claims.

All can be heard within the bracket; Section 1 structure, Section 2 intent and RICO proofs. Please consider one of multiple proofs below:

In the RICO proof below, find partial classic Intel Xeon Tanner and Xeon Copper mine economic analysis. Playing signaling revealed by the Quanda, savvy PC Dealers were informed to stick with the quasi static equilibrium and back eddy offered by Xeon Tanner, and to avoid being washed over the falls that is Xeon Cascades.

Cascades is the Intel desktop microprocessor Copper mine 256, repackaged as a high performance Xeon server product at monopoly price premium and for dumping onto AMD. Xeon Cascades was not a high performance product and by June 2000 main board suppliers serving the broker system market, had rejected it, causing Intel to cancel its retail boxed version of the Cascade product line. Cascade’s was then left to sell through Intel primary Dealer channels.

Please note that AMD Opteron code names; Sledge Hammer and Claw Hammer, follow in response to Intel Network notice of Tanner signaling and pending Cascade predatory product dumping. Dumping is relied on by Intel a lot.

Strategically to stop current competitive product flows in channels or to make it unprofitable for competitors to enter that product category.


Full Document and Source:
www.CEOpaulOtellini.com
on Top of Site...

Information by
Mike Bruzzone
Intel Case Technical Analysis since 1996
Camp Marketing Consultancy

posted Here by
Crystal L. Cox
Investigative Blogger
Got an Intel Insider Trading TIP?
Crystal@CrystalCox.com

Intel Pays Dell Not To Launch AMD-Based Servers - Intel Corp. Is the King of Anti-Trust Violators, in My Opinion

Intel Can Do Whatever Intel Damn Well Pleases.
Now Sit Down and SHUT UP...

"" 85. A 2003 internal Dell document explains the program rationale, funding methodology, and negotiated documentation, including the following highlights:

“The intent of the MCP program is to provide funding to Dell to combat the AMD threat in the marketplace since Dell is an Intel-only OEM for CPU’s”

“The MCP is negotiated on a quarterly basis.”

“There is not a formal ‘contract’ per se that documents all the terms and conditions of the MCP program for a quarter. Rather, the MCP terms and conditions are agreed upon via email and telephone communications, which are finalized in a spreadsheet that is agreed to by Dell and Intel for a particular quarter.” (Emphasis added).

86. As mentioned in the memo, throughout this period, top executives at both companies took care that the dealings between them were kept secret. Although billions of dollars in rebate payments flowed from Intel to Dell during the period 2002-2006, there was no formal documentation of the secret agreements which led to them.

3. Intel Conveyed Threats To Dell

87. Intel repeatedly made it clear to Dell that, if Dell wanted Intel’s support, Dell would have to direct its efforts against AMD. For example, in preparation for upcoming funding negotiations with Intel in 2002, a Dell executive, who regularly acted as an informal liaison between Dell and Intel, explained that Intel would not tolerate a Dell shift to AMD CPUs.

Specifically, this Dell executive wrote to Michael Dell and others: “If [Dell starts to use] AMD [CPUs], [Intel] would just give a [competitor] MOAP type dollars to match whatever we’re getting – they won’t sit around and let us transfer share to AMD…”

88. In emails and in testimony, the same Dell executive referred to this scenario – in which Intel cuts off some or all funding to Dell and shifts it to a Dell competitor – as a “double whammy.” In one instance, this executive wrote that Intel intended to use an upcoming Dell- Intel meeting to force Dell to discuss how Dell “plan[s] to drive” total market shift to Intel from AMD, and had a “perception that we’re [competing] against competitors seeking Intel CPUs, instead of marketing against AMD.”

Intel Repeatedly Renegotiates Its Payments
To Dell To Ensure “Monogamy”

89. Over the coming years, Intel and Dell fell into a pattern of negotiating the amount of Intel’s subsidies to Dell on a nearly continuous basis. These negotiations were tied to Intel’s aggressive efforts to prevent AMD from getting a toe-hold at Dell.

In each successive round of negotiations, the groundwork was usually laid by mid-level executives at both companies tasked with conveying messages and “positioning” to and from the other so that top executives at both firms would know what to expect when they met.

90. In advance of such a meeting, on June 24, 2002, Dell’s informal liaison reported back from conversations with Intel’s lead negotiator on what Dell’s then-COO Kevin Rollins, who was scheduled to meet with a top Intel executive, should expect at the meeting. Rollins was told by his subordinate that, “[w]ithout being blatant, [the Intel representative] will make it clear that Dell won’t get more MOAP if we do AMD. We’ll get less, and someone else will get ours.”

91. After the meeting, on July 9, 2002, Kevin Rollins reported to Michael Dell that the result of the meeting was that Intel was willing to increase payments to Dell and seemed
willing to do “whatever it takes” to keep Dell from purchasing from AMD.” Rollins wrote: “They got the message that we were very serious this time with our AMD assessment, and seem to want to do whatever it takes to persuade us not to go with [an AMD CPU] …. Initial word is that our MOAP should increase from the $70M this qtr to $100mm.”

. The “Boomerang” Episode

92. Dell periodically considered launching AMD-based products, notwithstanding
Intel’s fierce opposition. But its fear of Intel’s reaction, based on Intel’s explicit and implicit
threats, counseled strongly against any action. For example, in 2002, a Dell team explored a
potential switch to AMD for some of Dell’s CPU needs, in a project code-named “Boomerang”.

The study concluded, first, that “AMD offers a significant margin opportunity for [Dell’s]
Dimension and Inspiron” platforms, on account of price, cost and customer demand factors.

93. But the Boomerang study also identified Intel’s reaction as a “key question” in
the analysis and discussed the potential “opportunity cost” given Dell’s “[e]xclusive relationship
with Intel.” The study asked whether “MOAP [payments to Dell would] increase or decrease?
And over what time period – short term vs. long term?”

The Boomerang study attempted to quantify the projected margin benefit from adopting AMD, concluding that “[up] to 32% of MOAP program could be risked” before Intel’s retaliation, in the form of reduced MOAP, would outweigh the benefits of switching certain platforms to AMD CPUs.

94. The key Dell executive acting as informal liaison between the two companies
commented on the results of the “Boomerang” study.

He warned that the “worst-case downside” scenario is that Intel would “eliminate ~$250M of Dell meet-comp MOAP for some period,” and moreover, that “Intel [would] give this MOAP to competitors to ensure that Intel does not lose [market share] to a Dell AMD [system].”

The “net effect” would be that Dell would “not only lose ~$250 [million], we probably have to do incremental [discounting] on our Intel platforms against competitors who [would] now [be] subsidized with an extra $250M from Intel.”

95. A confirming contemporaneous internal Intel email from Intel’s Dell account representative to top Intel executives states that Dell must be made to understand two things: First, that Intel’s payments to Dell would decrease “if they have AMD in their arsenal.” Second, that Dell should be warned of the “possibility that [MCP] dollars that we’re (sic) applied to DELL could go somewhere else” if Dell starts to offer AMD-based products.

96. The message was apparently conveyed in fact. A Dell executive testified that, at the time of the Boomerang analysis, Intel had conveyed “the concept of their statement back that … as long as [Dell is] Intel only, our discount structure is what it is.” He added that he understood from Intel that, “[i]f there was a change in our Intel only [status], then our discount program would have to be revisited.”

97. Under these circumstances, Dell decided not to launch AMD-based products at
that time. A Dell executive who was responsible for the “analytics” and “cost assumptions” of
the Boomerang study testified to the Attorney General that concern about Intel’s reaction was a substantial part of that decision. ""

Starting on Page 33 of Source Below
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/
nov/NYAG_v_Intel_COMPLAINT_FINAL.pdf
CEO Paul Otellini
More at www.DeniedPatent.com and www.Iviewit.TV on the Evils of Intel...

www.CEOPaulOtellini.com
Intel Pays Dell, AMD, Anti-Trust Violations,
CEO Paul Otellini, Kevin Rollins, Michael Dell